Can job competition prevent hold-ups? by Jansen, Marcel
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 03-51 
Economics Series 20 
December 2003 
 
 
Departamento de Economía 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (34) 91 624 98 75 
 
 
 
 
CAN JOB COMPETITION PREVENT HOLD-UPS? * 
 
Marcel Jansen 
 
Abstract 
We consider an economy in which firms need to invest in capital before they can advertise a job, 
while applicants may have to compete for jobs. Our aim to investigate how this competition 
affects the investment decisions of firms. Our first finding shows that the economy always 
generates the right number of jobs. However, with random search firms under-invest in capital. In 
contrast, if workers can direct their search towards firms with different capital levels, the 
equilibrium is efficient. This result contrasts sharply with the predictions of models with ex post 
wage bargaining that never yield an efficien allocation. Moreover, our results extend the 
efficiency of auction mechanisms to an environment with non-contractible investments.  
 
 
Keywords: hold-up, search, efficiency and auctions. 
 
JEL Classification: C78, D44, D83. 
 
 
M. Jansen, Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. E.mail: 
jansen@eco.uc3m.es. Phone: (34) 91 624 5740 
 
 
 
 
 
* This paper is based on Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis at the EUI in Florence. I am grateful to Ramon Marimon 
for supervision, and I would like to thank Giuseppe Bertola, John Kennes, Klaus Kultti, Claudio Michellacci, 
Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides and seminar audiences at the SED 1999 (Alghero), EUI, University 
of Helsinki and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid for helpful comments. 
1 Introduction
Under what conditions do firms offer an efficient distribution of jobs? In most
cases the answer depends on the type of labour market under consideration.
Here we concentrate on a labour market with search frictions. Furthermore,
we assume that firms need to invest in capital before they can enter the
labour market to look for a worker. A firm’s investment is therefore not
contractible and surplus sharing may allow workers to appropriate a share of
the returns on capital.
There is a sizeable literature that studies this type of hold-up problem1
within the realm of a standard matching model, assuming pairwise meetings
between firms and workers and bilateral wage negotiations. In that envi-
ronment the job distribution is never efficient (Davis, 2001). Either workers
have some bargaining power and wages increase with capital, creating a hold-
up problem, or all bargaining power is vested in firms, leading to very low
wages and excessive entry of firms. Moreover, similar arguments have been
advanced for investments in education (Laing, Palivos and Ping Wang, 1995,
and Moen, 1998), in general training (Acemoglu, 1997) and for complemen-
tary investments in education and capital (Acemoglu, 1996, and Masters,
1998).
The innovation of this study is that we allow for competition among
potential trading partners. Despite the market frictions, firms may attract
1Williamson (1975) and Groult (1984) show that hold-up problems arise due to a lack
of complete contingent contracts; with complete contracts all those who benefit from an
investment could be forced to pay their share of the cost. The hold-up literature also
proposed a number of solutions: parties can reallocate property rights (Williamson (1975),
Hart and Moore (1990)), impose breach penalties (MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)),
or enter into long-term relationships (Williamson (1975)). However, all these solutions
require that agents can arrange their relationships before they make the investment. This
is excluded by our assumption that investments are made before the firms meet workers.
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more than one applicant for the same job. The threat that the firm may hire
a different applicant therefore tends to limit the bargaining power of workers
vis-á-vis firms. To capture this natural loss of bargaining power, we assume
that firms auction their jobs to applicants. In accordance with the existing
literature, wages are therefore determined after the investments are made.
But applicants may have to compete with other workers to obtain the job
they applied for.
Our results show that this mechanism induces an efficient resource al-
location provided that workers can direct their search to different types of
firms.
The analysis builds on the recent literature on search and auctions (e.g.
Kultti, 1998, Shimer, 1999 or Julien, Kennes and King, 2000). This literature
established that auction mechanisms can induce efficiency in the standard
search environment. The characteristic of the efficient mechanisms is that
sellers use a reservation bid at the level of their endogenous outside option
value.
In order to focus on the investment margin, we initially restrict our atten-
tion to this class of efficient mechanisms. The particular rule that we consider
is a sealed bid second prize auction. In that case, the outcome of the wage
negotiations is reminiscent of Bertrand competition: either the firm has two
or more applicants who both receive their reservation wage (irrespective of
whether they are hired or not), or the firm has a single applicant who appro-
priates the entire surplus of the match. We show that these payments reflect
the actual productivity of applicants. For a given investment level, firms
therefore have the right incentives to create jobs. Nonetheless, the surplus
of a job may accrue to the worker and this creates a scope for hold-ups.
This scope for hold-ups is formalized by our first result. It shows that the
equilibrium is never efficient if workers apply for randomly selected jobs. The
problem with a random assignment of workers to jobs is that all firms face
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the same probability to attract a single applicant. Since the surplus of a job
increases with the capital stock, this leads to a positive relation between the
expected wage costs and the investment level of a firm. Firms will therefore
not be able to appropriate the entire marginal returns on capital and this
leads to under-investment.
Our next result shows that the hold-up problem disappears when workers
can direct their search towards different types of firms. A sufficient condition
for the equilibrium with directed search is that workers (costlessly) observe
the capital stock of all firms before they make their applications. This as-
sumption creates a competitive environment in which each job opening needs
to offer unemployed workers the same expected income. A firm that increases
her investment level may therefore still need to pay a higher wage, but this
is now exactly compensated by a larger number of expected applicants and
hence a smaller probability that the firm will face a single applicant. From
the viewpoint of an individual firm the expected wage costs are therefore
independent of her investment level, resulting in efficient investments.
Finally, in a last step we allow firms to announce different reservation
profits. In this so-called competing auctions setup, application decisions re-
spond both to capital and the reservation strategy of firms. As long as these
variables are freely observable, we find that the equilibrium is efficient and
that firms announce their true outside option value. Our efficiency result is
therefore not contingent on our choice of the auction rule. When firms have
a choice, they select an auction rule in the class of efficient rules.
Our results illustrate the importance of job competition. Nonetheless, the
introduction of job competition is not sufficient. In order to attain a (con-
strained) efficient resource allocation, the labour market needs to generate
stronger competition for more attractive jobs. It is therefore crucial that
unemployed workers observe all the payoff-relevant information about jobs.
The conclusion that directed search may prevent hold-up problems is not
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entirely new. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) reached the same conclusion us-
ing a model of wage posting. However, their mechanism is entirely different.
With wage posting firms choose the wage at the same time as the invest-
ment. Hence, when a firm and a worker meet, there is no scope for wage
negotiations and thus no scope for hold-ups. In contrast, in our model wages
are determined after the investments are made, and the efficient allocation is
entirely supported by the competition between rival applicants. It stimulates
efficient investments and it prevents that firms a announce reservation bid
above the value of their outside option.
Finally, it is well-known that our job auction introduces strong incentives
for renegotiation. Consider a worker who is hired at her reservation wage.
Once the firm has discharged the other applicants, this worker has a clear
incentive to ask for a higher wage. Renegotiation is ruled out in most of
the analysis. Nonetheless, in an extension we show that none of our results
change if we allow renegotiation by mutual consent. The only additional
requirement is that both parties’ participation constraint needs to be satisfied
at each moment during the relationship. Our model is therefore consistent
with a simple model of multilateral bargaining in which workers’ surplus
share is decided once and for all before the start of production.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
environment and discusses the matching technology. Section 3 characterizes
the efficient resource allocation. This is followed in Section 4 by a discussion
of the equilibrium with random search. The equilibrium with directed search
is described in Section 5 while the equilibrium with posting, a simplified
analysis of the mechanism design problem for firms that wish to protect
their returns on non-contractible investments, is discussed in Section 6. This
section also describes the implications of renegotiation by mutual consent.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses directions for future
research.
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2 The Model
2.1 Main assumptions
There is a continuum of workers with measure normalized to one and a larger
continuum of firms. All agents are risk-neutral, live forever in discrete time
and have a common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The utility of an agent in
period t is equal to her consumption of the unique final good. All agents
therefore maximize the value of their expected lifetime income.
Workers are homogeneous and may be in one of two states, employed and
producing or unemployed and searching. Firms, on the contrary, are inactive
until they buy some capital k > 0 at constant marginal cost p, which allows
them to attempt to hire a worker by posting a vacancy. If a firm employs a
worker and k units of capital, it produces f(k) units of output per period.
The price of this good is normalized to one and f is assumed to be strictly
increasing and concave and satisfies the usual Inada conditions with f(0) = 0.
Finally, at the end of each period the capital stock of an active firm
breaks down with probability s. After this shock the firm returns to the
pool of inactive firms. Likewise, a worker whose job is destroyed becomes
unemployed with a flow income that is normalized to zero.
2.2 A model of job auctions
Our model of the labour market is based on Shimer (1999). In this sequential
search model firms auction their jobs to applicants and workers may have to
compete for jobs.
Let us start with the application decisions. At the start of a period
each unemployment worker can apply for one job. An application strategy
defines the probability that a worker applies for a job at each measurable
set of firms. Moreover, to capture the notion of a large market economy, we
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assume that all workers adopt the same optimal strategy. In any equilibrium,
some vacant jobs therefore attract many applicants, while other identical jobs
attract none.
After the application stage is concluded, firms hold job interviews and
solicit a wage bid from each applicant. The bid specifies the time path of
wages at which the applicant is willing to work. Firms review these bids
and decide whether to hire a worker, and if so, which one. The associated
wage payments are determined by an auction rule. This rule is known to all
participants and initially we assume that contracts are perfectly enforceable.
Hence, wages are determined once and for all at the start of a relationship and
for the moment we assume that contracts cannot be renegotiated. Finally, if
a firm is indifferent between two or more bids, it selects one bid at random.
The chosen worker begins her job at the start of the next period.
2.3 Example: random search
Further details of the hiring procedure are discussed in Section 3.1. In the
remainder of this section we describe the outcome of the application process
when workers cannot discriminate between jobs. From the viewpoint of ap-
plicants all jobs therefore look identical, and workers will apply for a job at
a randomly selected firm.
More precisely, suppose that in some labour market there are q ∈ [0,∞)
unemployed workers per vacancy seeking employment. If workers cannot
discriminate between jobs, q is also the (market) queue length or the expected
number of applicants of each vacancy. The probability that a firm receives
exactly n applications is then defined by:
ϕ(n, q) = q
ne−q
n!
. (1)
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According to (1), a vacant firm will attract at least one applicant with prob-
ability η(q) = 1 − e−q. This expression is known as the “urn ball matching
function”.2 If firms randomize over applicants, a similar expression may be
derived for workers. The probability that a worker is hired is then given by
µ(q) = η(q)/q = 1−e−q
q
. It is easy to verify that the urn ball matching tech-
nology satisfies all the usual properties: vη(q), the mass of vacancies with
at least one applicant, is linearly homogeneous in the mass of unemployed
workers and vacant jobs, η0(q) > 0, µ0(q) < 0, limq→0η(q) = limq→∞ µ(q) = 0
and limq→∞η(q) = limq→0 µ(q) =∞.
The matching probabilities with directed search are derived in Section 5.
In this case workers can perfectly discriminate among jobs. As a result, the
labour market may divide in several submarkets, each with a particular type
of a job and the associated (optimal) queue length.
2The urn ball matching technology was first used by Butters (1977). For recent appli-
cations see Moen (1999) or Shimer (1999).
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3 The Efficient Allocation
We start our analysis with a derivation of the constrained efficient resource
allocation.3 This allocation is derived using an imaginary social planner who
chooses the time path of the market queue length q, firms’ capital investment
k and the unemployment rate u to maximize the discounted value of output
minus the costs of vacancy creation.
Formally, the planner’s problem can be written as follows:
max
{q(t),k(t),u(t)}∞t=0
∞X
t=0
βt
·
u(t)µ(q(t))Y (k(t))− u(t)
q(t)
(1− β(1− s)) pk(t)
¸
(2)
s.t. u(t+ 1) = u(t) + s(1− u(t))− (1− s)µ(q(t))u(t) (3)
where
Y (k(t)) = β(1− s)
·
f(k(t))
1− β(1− s) − pk(t)
¸
. (4)
To understand the objective function, it is convenient to imagine firms renting
capital at a cost (1−β(1−s))p. The first term in parentheses then represents
the payoff from newly created jobs. Each of these jobs produces f(k(t)) units
of output per period. Moreover, production starts with one period delay
and firms must continue to pay the rental cost of their equipment. The net
expected present value of a filled job is therefore equal to Y (k(t)) as defined in
(4). The second term in parentheses represents the costs of maintaining open
vacancies, i.e. the rental cost of capital (1− β(1− s))p times the number of
vacancies u(t)/q(t), times the capital used by each vacancy k(t). The feature
that it is optimal to have only one type of firm in a market follows from the
3This section draws on Section 3 in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
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concavity of f(k).4 Finally, all payoffs are discounted to the initial period,
while the evolution of the unemployment rate u(t) satisfies eqn. (4).
Below we restrict attention to stationary allocations. In a steady state
the planner’s problem reduces to the maximization of the (constant) shadow
value of unemployed workers. This result is summarized in the Proposition
below, which reformulates Proposition 1 in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999):
Proposition 1 An efficient steady state solution exists. It is characterized
by a pair (qS, kS) ∈ (0,∞)2 solving:
max
{k,q}
β(1− s)η(q)
³
f(k)
1−β(1−s) − pk
´
− (1− β(1− s))pk
(1− β(1− s))q + β(1− s)η(q) . (5)
Proof. See Appendix.
Maximization problem (5) is not jointly concave in k and q. Hence, the first-
order conditions are not sufficient for a maximization. Nonetheless, because
the efficient solution is an interior solution, the first-order conditions are
necessary, and so they are useful in recognizing inefficient allocations. Using
the result that η(q) = 1− e−q, this yields:
Corollary 2 Any efficient allocation (qS, kS) satisfies:
β(1− s)(1− e−qS)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− e−qS)
µ
f 0(kS)
1− β(1− s)
¶
= p (6)
β(1− s)
³
1− e−qS − qSe−qS
´
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)
¡
1− qSe−qS
¢ µ f(kS)/kS
1− β(1− s)
¶
= p. (7)
4Appendix A provides a formal proof of this assertion.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Equation (6) characterizes the efficient investment level. The first fraction on
the left hand side is the expected current value of a unit of output when the
vacancy is first filled. This value is discounted because of both impatience
and the risk that the vacancy may break down before it is filled. The second
fraction is the discounted marginal product of capital once the vacancy is
filled. The left hand side of (6) therefore defines the marginal revenue of an
additional unit of capital. In an efficient allocation this must be equal to the
marginal cost of capital p.
q
k
KS
QS
qS
kS
Figure 1: The constrained efficient allocation
The efficient market queue length is defined in (7). The planner chooses q to
balance the expected social benefits of an additional vacancy with the costs
of creating this vacancy. In doing so, the planner takes into account that an
increase in the number of vacancies will reduce the rate at which outstanding
vacancies are filled. The net-increase in the mass of new jobs due to the
creation of an additional vacancy is therefore equal to ∂v(1 − e−q)/∂v =
(1− e−q − qe−q).
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The efficient allocation is illustrated in Figure 1. The curves associated
with eqs. (6) and (7) are denoted by KS and QS, respectively. Both curves
start in the origin and are strictly increasing in (q, k) space. Moreover, for
large enough values of q, QS lies above KS and the two curves intersect at
least once on the interior. Hence, as stated in Proposition 1, an efficient
allocation always exists. Finally, if there is more than one efficient combina-
tion (qS, kS) and if workers can discriminate among jobs, the planner may
decide to open more than one (sub)market. In that case the planner will
assign a longer queue to firms with a larger capital stock5. In an efficient
allocation, capital-intensive jobs are therefore filled at a faster rate than less
capital-intensive jobs.
3.1 efficient vs decentralized allocations
In the next sections we compare the efficient allocation to the decentralized
outcome. The investments in capital are now financed by firms and wages
are determined by auctions.
To concentrate on the investment decisions of firms, we initially impose
two conditions on the set of auction rules. First, we assume that the auction
rules are fair. A job is therefore awarded to the worker who demands the
lowest wage. Second, we assume that firms cannot credibly announce a
reserve bid above the value of their endogeneous outside option.
Together these two conditions define a set of revenue equivalent auction
rules. Moreover, each of these rules would induce an efficient resource al-
location if the value of productivity were exogeneous (e.g. Shimer, 1999).
For convenience, we shall consider the example of a sealed bid second prize
5This follows immediately from the feature thatQS andKS both have a strictly positive
slope. Thus, if there exist two efficient allocations, say (kS1 , qS1 ) and (kS2 , qS2 ), and kS1 > kS2
then it must be true that qS1 > q
S
2 .
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auction.6 Also, we shall assume that workers do not know the total number
of applicants when they formulate their wage demands. This is only revealed
ex post when the firm puts her offers “on the table”. The advantage of this
setup is that workers have a unique (weakly) dominant wage bid which is
equal to their outside option.
In the next two sections we use this setup to study the outcome when
workers cannot discriminate among jobs (“random search”) and when they
have perfect information about the capital investments of firms (“directed
search”). The case in which firms also choose and announce their reservation
profit is discussed in Section 6.
4 Random search
The purpose of this section is to formalize the scope for hold-up problems.
With random search there is no relationship between the investment level
of a firm and the application decisions of workers. All vacant firms expect
the same number of applicants and when a firm decides how much to invest
it will take this number as given. The notion of an equilibrium is therefore
similar to Davis (2002).
Formally, let K denote the set of equilibrium investment levels and let
the variable JV (k) denote the expected value of a vacant job with k units of
capital. A steady state equilibrium with random search must then satisfy the
following conditions: (i) Firms have rational expectations about q. (ii) The
investment level of a new entrant maximizes her expected profits JV (k0)−pk0.
(iii) New entrants make zero profits. (iv) Match formation is voluntary. (v)
The wage payments of workers correspond to the equilibrium of a sealed bid
second prize auction.
6The same setup is used in Shimer (1996). For an analysis of the more realistic case of
a first prize auction see Shimer (1999).
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The model is solved backwards starting with wages, and for the moment
I assume that condition (iv) is always satisfied.7
4.1 Wages
Consider a vacant firm with k units of capital that attracts n > 0 applicants.
In the following we denote the contractual payoffs of a firm and a worker
by JF (k, n) and JE(k, n), respectively. These payoffs are discounted to the
start of the first period of production. Moreover, we denote the joint payoffs
of a firm-worker pair by S(k), so that S(k) = JF (k, n) + JE(k, n), while JU
denotes the asset value of an unemployed worker
It is easy to demonstrate that JU is also the unique weakly dominant
wage bid of an applicant (e.g. Shimer 1996). Hence, since workers are iden-
tical, there are two possible outcomes. In the first case, the firm has a single
applicant who submits a wage bid equal to JU . The firm hires the applicant
and agrees to a wage stream with value JE(k, 1) = S(k) − JV (k).8 In the
second case, the firm has several job candidates. Each of these applicants
submits a wage bid equal to JU and the firm selects one candidate at ran-
dom and offers this worker a contract with value JE(k, n) = JU ∀n > 1.
Since S(k) = JF (k, n) + JE(k, n), the outcome of the auction can thus be
summarized as follows:
7When I characterise the investment decisions, I will show that this is indeed an equi-
librium feature. In equilibrium it is never optimal for a firm to create a job that is
subsequently refused by all workers.
8Given that agents are risk neutral, they are indifferent between contracts with the
same expected values JF (k, n) and JE(k, n). Moreover, the timing of the payments is
irrelevant because contracts are perfectly enforceable and cannot be renegotiated. This
last assumption is relaxed in Section 6.2.
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JE(k, n) =



S(k)− JV (k) if n = 1
JU if n > 1.
(8)
Similarly,
JF (k, n) =



JV (k) if n = 1
S(k)− JU if n > 1.
(9)
Hence, the firm receives the entire value of the surplus if it has at least two
applicants. Otherwise the surplus accrues to the single applicant.9
4.2 Asset values
We are now in a position to derive the value functions for the unattached
agents. These functions depend on the value of the future matches in which
an agent will be involved, and on the probability that the associated match
surplus accrues to the firm or the worker. The value of S(k) is defined by
the following standard Bellman equation:
S(k) = f(k) + β[(1− s)S(k) + sJU ]. (10)
According to (10) the joint value of a match is equal to the payoffs in the
current period, f(k), plus the expected discounted payoffs in the next period.
9As explained in the Introduction, the standard approach is to assume ex post wage
bargaining. In those models the bargaining power of a firm and a worker is fixed. In
contrast, in our model the bargaining strength is endogeneously assigned to either the
firm or the worker.
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The probability that a match survives is equal to (1− s), in which case both
parties continue to obtain S(k). With complementary probability s, however,
the capital equipment is destroyed. The match will be dissolved and the firm
becomes inactive with payoffs equal to zero, while the worker returns to the
pool of unemployed with payoffs equal to JU . Rearranging terms, this yields
the following expression:
S(k) =
f(k) + sβJU
1− β(1− s) . (11)
Next, consider the expression for JV (k). With random search the number
of applicants of a firm is distributed according to (1). Moreover, the expected
payoffs for each realization of n are defined by (9). The asset value of a vacant
firm can therefore be expressed as the weighted sum of three contingent
payoffs:
JV (k) = β(1− s)
£
(e−q + qe−q)JV (k) + (1− e−q − qe−q)(S(k)− JU)
¤
.
(12)
First of all, with probability e−q the firm receives no applications and remains
vacant. Second, with probability qe−q the firm receives exactly one applica-
tion and settles for a payoff equal to JF (k, 1) = JV (k), leaving the surplus to
the worker. Finally, with complementary probability 1− e−q − qe−q the firm
has more than one applicant. In this case the firm retains the surplus and
receives JF (k, n) = S(k) − JU . Finally, in all three events the payoffs need
to be discounted to account for time preference and the risk of breakdown.
The value function of an unemployed worker is slightly more complicated,
as vacant firms may have different capital stocks:
JU = β
·
(1− e−q)JU + e−q
Z
[(1− s)(S(k)− JV (k)) + sJU ]dG(k)
¸
. (13)
17
With random search the value of an unemployed worker therefore depends on
the entire distribution of capital stocks across vacant firms, which I denote by
G(k), and on the number of applicants with whom the worker will compete.
It is easy to show that a worker is the only applicant with probability e−q. In
this case the worker is hired and unless the capital equipment breaks down
she receives a payoff equal to JE(k, 1) = S(k) − JV (k).10 The probability
that the firm has at least one additional applicant is thus equal to 1 − e−q,
and in this case the worker receives JU regardless whether she is hired or
not.
4.3 Equilibrium
Given the payoff functions for firms and workers, we can now derive the
equilibrium.
4.3.1 Investments and hold-up
Our first task is to derive the profit-maximizing investment level(s) for a
given value of q. To solve this problem, we substitute the solution for S(k)
into the right-hand side of (12):
JV (k) =
β(1− s)(1− e−q − qe−q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− e−q − qe−q)
·
f(k)− (1− β)JU
1− β(1− s)
¸
.
(14)
10Notice that this interpretation is based on the auxiliary assumption that payment
start at the beginning of production period. In reality, however, contracts are enforceable
and all payments could in principle be made immediately after the contract is signed. In
that case the worker would receive β(1− s)(S(k) − JV (k)) in the first period and JU in
the next period in case the match breaks down. The expected value of payments is the
same under both interpretations.
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The above equation defines JV (k) as the expected profit from hiring a worker
at her reservation wage (1− β)JU . The probability of this event is equal to
1 − e−q − qe−q. Moreover, from our discussion of (13) we know that the
reservation wage of workers is not affected by the investment decision of a
single firm.
The derivation of the equilibrium investments is now straightforward.
Each firm that enters the market maximizes expected profits JV (k0) − pk0
taking q and the investment decisions of all other firms as given. This leads
to the following first order condition:11
β(1− s) (1− e−q − qe−q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s) (1− e−q − qe−q)
·
f 0(k)
1− β(1− s)
¸
= p. (15)
Equation (15) is our first equilibrium condition. It defines the investment
level of firms as a strictly increasing function of the likelihood that a firm
attracts at least two applicants. In any equilibrium firms therefore make
the same investment and G(k) is degenerate. Furthermore, what is more
important, a comparison with (6) shows that firms underinvest in capital.
Lemma 3 For any given value of q <∞, firms under-invest in capital
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. With homogeneous agents on
both sides of the market, all jobs that attract at least one applicant will be
filled. The social marginal returns from an investment in capital are therefore
proportional to η(q) = 1−e−q. However, firms only consider their own private
marginal returns which are proportional to 1 − e−q − qe−q. Firms therefore
11Since f(k) is strictly concave, the second order conditions are always satisfied.
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disregard the share of the returns that may accrue to a single applicant and
since f(k) is strictly concave, this gives rise to underinvestment.
It is important to understand the origin of this hold-up problem. With
random search q is the same for all firms. The probability that a firm attracts
one or more applicants is therefore unrelated to the investment level of the
firm. However, the implicit cost of search, in terms of foregone output,
increases with the investment level of the firm. As a result, both the surplus
of a job and the income of a single applicant S(k)− JV (k) increase with k,
and when a firm decides how much to invest it will anticipate that a share
of the marginal returns of the investment may accrue to the worker.12
Finally, it is easy to demonstrate that the actual chance of a hold-up
is particularly strong at low values of q. With a small number of expected
applicants, firms face a high probability of meeting exactly one applicant.13
The private marginal returns from an investment are therefore low compared
to the social marginal gains. In contrast, when q approaches infinity, firms
receive more than one applicant with probability 1 and both returns coincide.
4.3.2 Entry
The derivation of the entry condition is entirely standard. First of all, since
G(k) is degenerate, JU simplifies to:
JU =
β(1− s)e−q
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)e−q
·
f(k)− (1− β(1− s))JV (k)
1− β
¸
, (16)
which has a similar interpretation as (14).
12This is similar to the hold-up problem in Davis (2001), except that he examines a
model with pairwise matching and ex post bargaining. As a result, in his model all
workers obtain a share of the returns on capital.
13The conditional probability that a firm attracts exactly 1 applicant is equal to
qe−q/(1 − e−q). After applying l’Hˆopital’s rule, it follows that this probability goes to1
when q approaches zero.
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Next, we need to substitute (16) into the right-hand side of (14). The
resulting expression can be solved for JV (k) and invoking the free entry
condition JV (k)− pk = 0 we obtain:
β(1− s) (1− e−q − qe−q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− qe−q)
µ
f(k)/k
1− β(1− s)
¶
= p. (17)
This free entry condition coincides with (7). Hence, conditional on an efficient
value for the capital stock, kS, the labour market will generate the efficient
number of jobs. However, from the preceding discussion of investments we
know that the reverse does not hold. Given an efficient value for the market
queue length qS, firms are not willing to adopt the efficient capital stock.
The equilibrium with random search is therefore never efficient.
q
k
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QS
qR
kR
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Figure 2: The equilibrium with random search
This feature is illustrated in Figure 2. The curve associated with free entry
condition (17) is denoted by QR = QS, while the investment locus associ-
ated with (15) is denoted by KR. Due to the hold-up problem this locus
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lies entirely below KS. The decentralized equilibrium with random search,
denoted by the pair (kR, qR), is therefore never efficient. Finally, if kS and
qS are small, the investment locus KR may lie entirely below the free entry
locus QR. In this case there exists no (interior) equilibrium.
To rule out this last case, it suffices to impose a mild restriction on the
concavity of f(k). In particular, let ²(k) denote the elasticity of f(k) with
respect to k, so that ²(k) = f 0(k)k/f(k). A sufficient condition for the
existence of an equilibrium is then given by:
Condition 1 limk→0 ²(k) > 1− β(1− s).
The properties of the equilibrium are summarized below.
Proposition 4 (Existence) Given Condition 1, an equilibrium with ran-
dom search always exists.
Proposition 5 (Efficiency) The equilibrium with random search never co-
incides with an efficient allocation. Either firms underinvest and kR < kS,
or entry is too low and qR > qS.
Proposition 6 (Uniqueness) If ²(k) is non-increasing in k, the equilib-
rium is unique and firms underinvest in capital.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 formalizes the scope for hold-ups in our economy. This result
contrasts sharply with the efficiency of our auction rule in the standard search
environment (e.g. Kultti, 1998 and Shimer, 1996). With ex ante investments
firms’ entry decisions are still optimal for a given value of capital. But firms
anticipate that the expected wage costs increase with the investment level
and this results in an inefficient choice of capital.
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The explanation for the efficient entry margin is provided in Shimer
(1996). Namely, with a second prize auction applicants are paid their ac-
tual marginal product. Suppose that a firm receives a single applicant. By
contacting the firm, the applicant raises the joint wealth of the firm-worker
pair from JV (k)+JU to S(k). In order to hire the worker the firm would thus
be willing to pay at most S(k)−JV (k). In contrast, if the firm receives more
than one applicants, only one new job is created. The marginal productivity
of each individual worker is thus equal to zero, and the firm would not be
willing to pay any of these workers more than her reservation value.
There also exists a clear relation with the so-called Hosios condition.
According to this condition, wages correctly reflect productivity if workers’
share of the match surplus is equal to the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to u. With the urn ball matching technology this elasticity
is given by η
0(q)q
η(q) =
qe−q
1−e−q . But this is nothing else than the conditional
probability that the surplus of a job accrues to the worker (see footnote 11).14
Hosios’ condition is therefore satisfied. Nonetheless, with random search
14This generalises an important result in Mortensen (1982). For the case of a pairwise
linear matching technology, Mortensen showed that the efficient allocation can be decen-
tralised if the property rights to a match are assigned to the agent who iniates the contact.
The usefullness of this result was later questioned on two grounds (e.g. Pissarides, 2000).
First, with pairwise matching it is often not possible to determine who initiated the match.
Second, Mortensen’s matching technology does not exhibit congestion externalities. The
urn ball matching technology does exhibit these externalities and efficiency is obtained un-
der a similar rule. Namely, when the property rights are assigned to the agent on the short
side. The reason that Mortensen’s rule still generates efficiency is also easily explained.
When creating a job, firms disregard the returns that accrue to a single applicant. As
a result, the private marginal returns are equal to (1 − eq − qe−q) times the surplus of
the match. However, this is exactly the social marginal return from job creation since
∂v(1 − e−q)/∂v = (1 − eq − qe−q). In other words, the fact that firms disregard the re-
turns of a single applicant compensates for the reduction in the matching rate of existing
vacancies. The congestion externality is therefore perfectly internalised.
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this surplus share creates a hold-up problem. The equilibrium allocation is
therefore never efficient.
5 Directed search
In this section we study the same environment as before. But in contrast to
Section 4, we now assume that workers have perfect information about the
capital stock of all the advertised jobs.
This change of the information structure has two important implications.
First of all, because workers can discriminate between jobs, the labour market
may divide into several submarkets. Firms with different jobs therefore no
longer need to attract the same number of expected applicants.
Second, given their knowledge about the queue length for each type of
job, unemployed workers are able to compute the expected income from an
application at any of the vacant firms. Hence, if workers decide to apply for
different types of jobs, then the queue lengths must be such that workers are
indifferent between these jobs.
This arbitrage relationship is a typical feature of models with directed
search. To understand how it affects our results, it is useful to consider
what happens if a firm (or formally, an infinitesimally small mass of firms)
deviates to a higher investment level. With random search, the higher invest-
ments raised the income of a single applicant, S(k)−JV (k), but unemployed
workers could not respond to this incentive because they had no information
about the vacant jobs. In contrast, with directed search workers observe
the deviation. The deviant firms will therefore attract a longer queue of
applicants who all wish to appropriate the larger surplus. Moreover, in the
new outcome workers are indifferent between the deviant firms and the rest
of the firms. The expected wage costs are therefore not affected by the
higher investment– the higher remuneration of a single applicant is exactly
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compensated by the longer queue and the lower probability to meet a sin-
gle applicant – and deviant firms are able to appropriate the full marginal
returns on their investment
Below we show that this mechanism creates a competitive environment
in which firms make constrained-efficient investments. The analysis exploits
the reduced-form characterization of competitive search equilibria developed
by Moen (1997). We denote the expected number of applicants of a firm
with k units of capital by q(k). Moreover, compared to the previous section,
we impose two stronger conditions on the equilibrium allocation: (i-a) The
common application strategy of unemployed workers maximizes their actual
expected income JU for any arbitrary distribution G(k). (i-b) Firms’ beliefs
about q(k) are consistent with rational expectations beginning at any decision
node and for all feasible values of k. This last restriction is needed to rule out
situations in which firms would fail to deviate to a profitable investment level
because they incorrectly conjecture too few workers would apply. Conditions
(i-a) and (i-b) replace condition (i) in Section 4. The rest of the conditions
is the same as before.
5.1 Analysis
We start the analysis by writing the Bellman equations. With targeted ap-
plications, the value of a vacant job with k units of capital satisfies
JV (k) = β(1− s)[(e−q(k) + q(k)e−q(k))JV (k) +
(1− e−q(k) + q(k)e−q(k))(S(k)− JU)], (18)
where q(k) is the job-specific queue length.
Similarly, the value of an application at a firm with capital-intensity k,
JU(k), satisfies:
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JU(k) = β((1− e−q(k))JU + e−q(k)
¡
(1− s)
¡
S(k)− JV (k)
¢
+ sJU
¢
). (19)
The derivation of (19) parallels equation (13), with the value of an unem-
ployed worker now defined by the highest value she can obtain while unem-
ployed. That is,
JU = sup
k∈K
JU(k). (20)
Finally, it is easy to show that all jobs that attract some workers need to
offer the same maximal utility JU . Suppose some jobs would offer a smaller
payoff. In that case workers could gain by redirecting their search to the
jobs with the highest payoffs and this would violate condition i-a. Hence,
in equilibrium all submarkets yield the same expected income JU . This last
feature allows us to solve equations (18)-(19) for all k ∈ K. This procedure
yields a payoff function
JV (k) =
β(1− s)
¡
1− e−q(k) − q(k)e−q(k)
¢
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− q(k)e−q(k))
·
f(k)
1− β(1− s)
¸
(21)
for firms offering a job with k ∈ K units of capital, and
JU =
β(1− s)e−q(k)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− q(k)e−q(k))
·
f(k)
1− β
¸
(22)
for workers who apply for these jobs.
On the basis of the above equations we can immediately conclude that
firms continue to create an efficient number of jobs. To obtain this result, it
26
suffices to substitute (21) into the zero profit condition JV (k)−pk = 0. This
yields
β(1− s)
¡
1− e−q(k) − q(k)e−q(k)
¢
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− q(k)e−q(k))
·
f(k)/k
1− β(1− s)
¸
= p,
which coincides with (7).
The difference with the previous section concerns the choice of capital.
Namely, with directed search firms correctly anticipate the best reply of
unemployed workers to changes in their investment strategy. This response
is governed by (22). For a given value of JU , this equation defines a strictly
positive relationship between the capital stock and the queue length in each
sub-market. Moreover, since JU is not affected by the decisions of a single
firm, the same relationship also defines the queue length that results if some
firm deviates by offering a job with k0 /∈ K units of capital. Denote this
relationship by q(k; JU). From (22) it follows immediately that q(k; JU) is
continuous, strictly increasing in k and strictly decreasing in JU on (k,∞)×
(0,∞), where k is defined by JU = β(1− s)(f(k)/(1− β)). Furthermore, for
capital levels below this threshold, JV (k) < JU for all q ≥ 0. In equilibrium
no worker will therefore apply for these jobs, and so q(k) = 0 ∀k < k.
We can now formalize Condition i-b by requiring that firms’ beliefs about
q(k) are consistent with q(k; JU) for all values of k, including the values of
capital that are not actually observed in equilibrium.15 Individual firms take
this relationship as given and choose k to maximize profits. Let JV (k, q(k; JU))
denote the asset value of a vacancy given the equilibrium relation q(k; JU).
15Since workers have perfect information, the queue length associated with each capital
level k0 /∈ K becomes instantly observable as soon as a firm deviates to offer this capital
stock. It seems reasonable therefore to assume that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of firms
are consistent with q(k;JU ).
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Profit maximization and the assumption of free entry of firms then imply
that in equilibrium the following condition must hold:
JV (k, q(k; JU))− pk ≤ 0 ∀k, (23)
with equality if k ∈ K.
q
k
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qS
kS
Figure 3: The equilibrium with directed search
The equilibrium with directed search is depicted in Figure 3. The curve QS
is the socially efficient entry locus. As explained before, this curve starts in
the origin and is strictly increasing on the whole domain (q, k) ∈ (0,∞)2.
Moreover, at (q, k) combinations to the right of this locus firms make strictly
positive profits, while points above this curve correspond to losses. Workers,
on the contrary, value high investment levels and short queues. Their indif-
ference curves have a positive slope, and indifference curves that are located
further away from the origin correspond to higher values of JU . According
to condition (23), equilibrium allocations therefore correspond to a point of
tangency between the zero profit locus of firms and the highest attainable
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indifference curve of workers, denoted by (kD, qD) = (kS, qS).16
This feature of the model allows us to characterize equilibrium allocation
as the outcome of a simple constrained optimization problem:
Lemma 7 The pair (q(k; JU),K) with elements kD ∈ K and qD = q(kD; JU)
is a steady-state equilibrium with directed search iff (qD, kD) solves:
JU = max
{k,q}
β(1− s)e−q
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− qe−q)
µ
f(k)
1− β
¶
subject to:
β(1− s) (1− e−q − qe−q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− qe−q)
µ
f(k)/k
1− β(1− s)
¶
− p ≥ 0. (P1)
The proof of Lemma 7 is standard. Suppose that firms offer jobs with a
lower capital-intensity k0 < kD. This case is illustrated by point D = (k0, q0)
in Figure 4. It is easy to show that this outcome cannot be an equilibrium.
Consider a firm that deviates from the alleged equilibrium by investing an
amount kD. From our previous discussion, we know that the firm will attract
a queue of applicants of length qDEV . Moreover, the point (kD, qDEV ) lies
below the free entry locus which shows that the expected profits of the deviant
firm are positive. Hence, the combination (k0, q0) cannot be an equilibrium
and firms will continue to create jobs with kD units of capital until the
16Our restrictions on the production technology are not sufficient to guarantee that the
zero-profit curve is concave. As a result, there may be multiple equilibrium allocations.
However, this is not important for the analysis since each of these allocations must cor-
respond to a point of tangency between the free entry locus and the highest attainable
indifference curve. The equilibrium welfare level of workers is thus uniquely determined.
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queue length for these jobs is reduced to qD. At this point, the workers’
indifference curve is tangent to the free entry locus QS(k) and no firm can
gain by deviating from this allocation as JV (k, q(k; JU))− pk < 0 ∀k 6= kD.
Hence, in our example (kD, qD) is the unique equilibrium and this pair solves
optimization problem P1 in Lemma 7.
q
k
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JU
kS
k´
q´ qDEV
JU(k´)
D
Figure 4: Profitable deviations
5.2 Efficiency
We are now in a position to derive our main efficiency result. According to
Lemma 7, the equilibrium investment decisions of firms maximize the ex-
pected income of unemployed workers, subject to the condition that entrants
make zero profits. Moreover, we know that the free entry condition is effi-
cient because applicants are paid their actual marginal product. Hence, as
in the planner’s solution, firms’ investments maximize the shadow value of
unemployed workers. This leads to our main efficiency result:
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Proposition 8 If (q(k; JU),K) is an equilibrium with directed search with
elements kD ∈ K and qD = q(kD; JU), then (qD, kD) is an efficient allocation
as defined in Proposition 1. Conversely, if (qS, kS) is an efficient allocation as
characterized in Proposition 1, then there exists an equilibrium with directed
search such that kS ∈ K and qS = q(kS; JU).
Proof. See Appendix.
The difference with Proposition 4 is that firms make efficient investments.
The ability of workers to direct their search to firms with different capi-
tal stocks therefore resolves the holdup problem. Namely, it allows firms
to increase their investments and attract more applicants without incurring
higher expected wage costs. In a neighbourhood around the equilibrium firms
therefore acquire the entire marginal returns on their investments. Together
with the efficiency of the entry margin this ensures that firms make efficient
investments.
6 Posting and renegotiation
The previous sections identified the two necessary conditions for efficiency.
In equilibrium workers need to be paid their (actual or expected) shadow
value and unemployed workers need to be able to direct their search to firms
with different capital stocks.
So far, the first condition is satisfied because firms could not commit to
a reservation bid above the value of their outside option. Furthermore, we
assumed that contracts are perfectly enforceable and ruled out renegotia-
tion. In this section we show that both assumptions can be relaxed without
changing our main efficiency result.
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6.1 Posting
Suppose that firms can credibly announce any reservation bid and let us
denote the optimal reserve bids by π(k). The next proposition shows that
this endogenous choice of auction rules does not change our results as long
as workers can costlessly observe the reserve bids before they make their
application decisions. Formally17
Proposition 9 Suppose firms can credibly announce their reservation bids
and unemployed workers can observe both the reserve bids and the capital
stock of firms. Then, the set of equilibria coincides with the set of efficient
allocations as characterized in Proposition 1 and firms announce their outside
option values, so that π(kS) = pkS.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, if firms have a choice, they will opt for an auction rule in our class of
efficient rules. Proposition 9 therefore corroborates our earlier results.
The result that firms prefer to announce their true outside option value is
similar to the predictions of the competing auction models of McAfee (1993),
Peters (1997, 2001) and Julien, Kennes and King (2000).18 However, in these
studies the value of matches is determined by exogenous factors. The value of
Proposition 9 is therefore that it extends these results to an environment with
ex ante investments. In particular, it shows firms do not intend to protect
17We implicitly extend the restriction on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of firms to all
feasible (π, k) combinations, so that firms correctly anticipate the queue length for any
choice of the reserve bid. For more details see Appendix D.
18McAfee (1993) and Peters (1997) study pricing behaviour in retail markets. Julien
et al. (2000) apply a similar setup to labour markets. However, in their model workers
commit to and announce reservation wages and firms select a worker to whom they offer
the job. In their model the role of workers and firms is therefore reversed. Finally, in
Peters (2001) the valuation of the object is private information of the buyers.
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their returns on capital by posting high reservation profits. A reservation
bid π(k) > pk would decrease the wage of a single applicant and prevent ex
post rent-sharing. But the overall effect on profits would be negative as firms
would attract fewer applicants.
6.2 Renegotiation by mutual consent
The last issue concerns the enforceability of the wage agreements. Under the
equilibrium wage rule one of the two parties is kept at her reservation value
throughout the entire relationship. The second-prize auction therefore cre-
ates a strong incentive for renegotiation once the parties have consummated
their match. For instance, an employee who was chosen among a total of n
applicants, may try to negotiate a higher wage once the firm has dismissed
the alternative n− 1 applicants.
So far, renegotiation was ruled out by assumption. However, this assump-
tion is unnecessarily strong. All that is needed is that renegotiation cannot
be imposed unilaterally by one of the parties. With a proper treatment of the
outside options this eliminates renegotiation in our model (e.g. Malcomson
et al. (1993) or Malcomson (1998)). The only requirement is that the con-
tractual payments need to satisfy the participation constraint of both agents
at each moment during their relationship. When this condition is satisfied,
renegotiation is a pure redistribution that will be refused by the party that
is entitled to the surplus. Hence, when we allow for renegotiation by mutual
consent, the timing of payments matters, but this does not change any of our
efficiency results.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that competition among rival applicants may
prevent hold-ups in markets with frictions. The analysis built on the compet-
ing auction literature pioneered by McAfee and Preston (1993). Our main
contribution is that we extend this framework to an environment in which the
productivity of employment relationships depends on ex ante investments by
firms. We show that this creates a scope for hold-ups. Moreover, following
the suggestion of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) we proof that the equilibrium
is efficient if workers can direct their search to different jobs.
There are many interesting ways to extend the analysis. One option is
to consider one-sided investments by workers. In this environment ex post
bargaining may lead to over-investment rather than under-investment (Moen
(1999)). The reason is that workers create a negative externality if they invest
more to jump ahead of other workers in the queues. With auctions this effect
should disappear. Since workers are valued efficiently, there is no difference
between the private and the social marginal gains from human capital and
workers should choose the optimal investment level.
Alternatively, one could consider complementary investments by firms
and workers. In that model the returns on capital depend on workers’ in-
vestment in human capital, while vice versa the returns on education and
training will depend on firms’ investment in capital. Under ex post wage
bargaining this strategic complementarity compounds the inefficiencies of
one-sided investments (Acemoglu (1996) and Masters (1998)). An issue that
is not yet resolved is whether job auctions or wage posting can reduce or
eliminate hold-up problems in this environment.
Thirdly, one could consider the role of private information. In our model
auctions are equivalent to wage posting whenever workers have perfect in-
formation about jobs. Firms could simply post the expected wage costs and
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hire a randomly selected candidate. This equivalence breaks down if work-
ers are risk averse – because auctions are more risky than posting –, or if
the number of agents on either side of the market is finite (Julien, Kennes
and King (2001)). So far, however, the role of the information structure has
not been studied in detail. It is easy to see that the information structure
matters. Consider for example the case that unemployed workers observe
wages, but not investments. In that case firms will opt for wage posting.
This mechanism allows firms to appropriate the entire marginal returns from
investments in capital, while auctions lead to hold-ups. Reversely, if workers
make ex ante investments and if the resulting skill level is private informa-
tion firms may prefer auctions. The reason is that auctions elicit the private
information from workers. With wage posting, on the contrary, this is only
feasible if firms can post a menu of contracts that induces workers to self-
select in different submarkets.
Finally, one may consider the role of education as a pure screening device.
In this environment education is wasteful in the sense that it does not affect
productivity. Nonetheless, it may improve the allocation of ex ante heteroge-
neous workers over jobs because it provides a signal about the innate ability
of workers. This and other topics are on our agenda for future research.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Characterization of efficient stationary allocations
Consider the Lagrangian function $ associated with eqs. (2)-(4):
$ =
∞X
t=0
βt{u(t)µ(q(t))Y (k(t))− u(t)
q(t)
(1− β(1− s)) pk(t)
−λ(t)[u(t+ 1)− u(t)− s(1− u(t)) + (1− s)µ(q(t))u(t)]} (24)
where λ(t) is the (undiscounted) shadow value of an unemployed worker in
period t and Y (k(t)) satisfies (4). Since we are interested in steady states,
we henceforth suppress all time indices. The first-order conditions for k, q
and u can then be written succinctly as:
u
·
µ(q)(1− s)β
·
f 0(k)
1− β(1− s) − p
¸
− 1
q
(1− β(1− s))p
¸
≤ 0, (25)
u
·
µ0(q)Y (k) +
1
q2
(1− β(1− s))pk − λ(1− s)µ0(q)
¸
≤ 0, (26)
βt
·
µ(q)Y (k)− 1
q
(1− β(1− s))pk + λ(1− s)(1− µ(q))
¸
− βt−1λ ≤ 0, (27)
At an internal solution, the above conditions will hold with equality, while
the employment rate u satisfies
s(1− u) = (1− s)µ(q)u. (28)
The existence of an internal maximum is demonstrated below. In this section
we want to show that the solution of conditions (25)-(27) coincides with the
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solution of (5). First of all, notice that the first order conditions for k and
q are linear in u. For any given value of λ, eqs. (25) and (26) can therefore
be solved for the optimal choice of k and q, independent of the value of u.
Denote these optimal choices by k(λ) and q(λ). Inspection of (25) and (26)
shows that these variables correspond to the solution of the following static
optimization problem:
max
{k,q}
µ
µ(q)Y (k)− λ(1− s)µ(q)− 1
q
(1− β(1− s))pk
¶
(29)
Equation (29) is a recursion that defines the shadow value of workers19; each
unemployed worker is hired with probability µ(q) and with probability (1−s)
this match yields net-output f(k)/(1 − β(1 − s)) in the next period. From
this we need to deduce the implicit cost of hiring labour λ and capital pk.
Moreover, while a worker is unemployed the planner sustains 1/q vacancies
for her, and the flow cost of these vacancies is given by the last term on the
right.
In order to use (29) to solve for the efficient value of k and q, we need to
show that λ is independent of u. This follows from eq. (27). Solving this
equation for λ yields:
λ= β


β(1− s)η(q)
³
f(k)
1−β(1−s) − pk
´
− (1− β(1− s))pk
(1− β(1− s))q + β(1− s)η(q)

 , (30)
which shows that the shadow value of workers does not depend on u. The
same is therefore true for k(λ) and q(λ). Finally, substituting (30) in (29)
19More precisely, according to (27) the maximand in (29) corresponds to the flow return
(1− β(1− s))λ.
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yields eqn. (5) in the main text. The solution to this static optimization
problem thus characterizes the efficient (steady state) capital investment and
queue length, while the associated unemployment rate uS can be found by
substituting qS into (28).
(ii) Existence of an interior solution
Let V (k, q) denote the value of maximand (5) which is continuous on (k, q) ∈
(0,∞)2. The following results are immediate: limq→0 V (k, q) < 0; limq→∞ V (k, q) =
0; limk→0 V (k, q) = 0; limk→∞ V (k, q) < 0;
Extremal values of k and/or q can therefore never be a solution as long as
we can show that there exist positive and finite values of k and q for which
V (k, q) is strictly positive. Following Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) this can
be established using the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. Fix any positive
value of q such that η(q) > 0 and define the value of kq by:
β(1− s)η(q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)η(q)f
0(kq) = (1− β(1− s)) p (31)
Such a strictly positive value for kq always exists, since we assumed that
limk→0 f
0(k) = ∞. Then by the fundamental theorem of calculus, it follows
that V (q, kq) is equal to:
kqZ
0
(1− s)βη(q)f 0(κ)− (1− β(1− s)) (1− β(1− s) + (1− s)βη(q)) p
(1− β(1− s)) q + β(1− s)η(q) dκ >
kqZ
0
(1− s)βη(q)f 0(kq)− (1− β(1− s)) (1− β(1− s) + (1− s)βη(q)) p
(1− β(1− s)) q + β(1− s)η(q) dκ = 0
(32)
which is strictly positive. The maximum is therefore an interior extremum
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary conditions. In addition, the
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payoffs in the original infinite horizon problem are simply equal to the dis-
counted sum of the constant per period payoffs. These payoffs are therefore
also well-defined and since qS is strictly positive and finite, the steady state
unemployment rate is strictly positive. Equations (25)-(29) therefore hold
with equality and a stationary solution to the original dynamic programme
exists and coincides with the solution to (5) in the main text.
(iii) Properties of the efficient allocation
The first-order conditions for maximization problem (5) are specified in
Corollary 2. The first-order condition for kS defines a strictly increasing
and continuous function KS(q) that maps (0,∞) onto (0, kS), where kS is
implicitly defined by
β(1− s) f
0(k
S
)
1− β(1− s) = p.
Similarly, first-order condition (7) defines a strictly increasing function
QS(k) that maps (0,∞) onto (0,bkS), where bkS satisfies
β(1− s) f(
bkS)/bkS
1− β(1− s) = p.
From the concavity of f(k) it follows that bkS > kS. Hence, in the domain
(q, k) the graph of QS lies above the graph associated with KS for values of
q close to infinity. Moreover, both graphs start in the origin and from (i) it
follows that they intersect at least once more on the interior.¥
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Existence
First, consider the graph of eqn. (15). Since the first term on the left is
increasing in q and f(k) is strictly concave, this graph is upward sloping in
(q, k) space. Moreover, the left-hand side of (15) is continuously differentiable
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with respect to q and k on the whole domain [0,∞]2. The conditions of the
implicit function theorem are therefore satisfied and eqn. (15) implicitly
defines a function KR(q) that is monotonically increasing, continuous and
differentiable with K(0) = 0 and limq→∞KR(q) = k¯, where 0 < k¯ < ∞ is
implicitly defined by:
β(1− s) f
0(k¯)
1− β(1− s)= p. (33)
Next, dividing (17) by (15) we arrive at the following expression:
β(1− s)e−q
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− e−q − qe−q)=
1− ²(k)
²(k)
(34)
The left-hand side of (34) is a strictly decreasing function of q that maps
[0,∞] onto [0, β(1−s)
1−β(1−s) ]. Hence, whenever ²(k) > 1− β(1− s), there exists a
value of q > 0 that solves (34). Let us denote this solution by QR(k).
Under Condition 1, there are three possible cases. Case I : The production
function is iso-elastic. In this case QR(k) defines a vertical line at some
strictly positive and finite value of q. Case II : The elasticity of the production
function is monotonically decreasing. In this second case, QR(k) defines a
downward-sloping curve. This curve starts at a vertical intercept (q, k) =
(0, ek), where ek > 0 is implicitly defined by:
1
1− β(1− s)=
f(ek)
f 0(ek)ek , (A13)
and it cuts the x-axis (k = 0) at some strictly positive value of q. Case III :
The elasticity of the production function is locally increasing. As a result,
the graph of QR(k) has a positive slope. However, given that f(k) is concave,
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the elasticity cannot be monotonically increasing on the entire domain. In
the rest of the domain we are therefore in Cases I or II.
In all three cases, the graphs of QR(k) and KR(q) intersect at least once
on the interior of [0,∞]2. Each such intersection defines an equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, if ²(k) is non-increasing the equilibrium is unique.¥
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider the Lagrangian function LD associated with P1 in Lemma 7:
LD=φ f(k)
1− β+µ
·
ϑ f(k)
1− β(1− s) − kp
¸
, (35)
where φ and ϑ satisfy:
φ = β(1− s)e
−q
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− qe−q)
ϑ = β(1− s)(1− e
−q − qe−q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− qe−q) ,
while µ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier.
Assuming an internal solution, we obtain the following first-order condi-
tions
φ f
0(k)
1− β + µ
·
ϑ f
0(k)
1− β(1− s) − p
¸
= 0 (36)
∂φ
∂q(k)
f(k)
1− β + µ
∂ϑ
∂q(k)
f(k)
1− β(1− s) = 0 (37)
ϑ f(k)
1− β(1− s) − kp = 0 (38)
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Equation (37) defines the value of µ.
µ=
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− e−q)
(1− β(1− s))q + β(1− s)(1− e−q)
1− β(1− s)
1− β (39)
Substituting this solution into (36) yields:
β(1− s) (1− e−q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− e−q)
µ
f 0(k)
1− β(1− s)
¶
= p (40)
This expression coincides with eq. (6). Hence, in any equilibrium with
directed search the investment margin is efficient. The efficiency of free entry
condition (38) was shown already in Section 4. The equilibrium allocation
therefore coincides with an efficient allocation and Proposition 1 shows that
such an efficient allocation (qS, kS) ∈ (0,∞)2 exists.¥
Proof of Proposition 9
Let JV (k,π) denote the value of a vacant firm with capital-intensity k and
reservation bid π. For an arbitrary value of q, JV (k,π) satisfies:
JV (k,π) = β(1− s)
¡
e−qJV (k, π) + qe−qπ + (1− e−q − qe−q)
¡
S(k)− JU
¢¢
.
(41)
Similarly, a worker who applies at this firm obtains a payoff JU(k, π) that
satisfies:
JU(k, π) = β
¡¡
1− e−q
¢
JU + e−q
¡
(1− s) (S(k)− π) + sJU
¢¢
. (42)
The difference with before is that a single applicant now receives S(k) − π
rather than S(k)−JV (k). A firm can therefore reduce the extent of (ex post)
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rent-sharing by announcing a reservation bid π > JV (k). However, this gain
needs to be offset against the drop in the expected number of applicants q.
In what follows we extend our restriction on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
to π. Hence, firms have rational expectations about the queue q associated to
all relevant values of k and π. Moreover, as before this includes combinations
of (k, π) that are not yet offered by other firms. Given this restriction, the
logic of Lemma 7 applies and any combination (k, π) that is observed in
equilibrium must maximize the welfare of a representative worker subject to
the zero profit condition of firms. Using eqs. (10), (41) and (42) this delivers
the following optimization problem:
max
{k,π,q}
β(1− s)e−q
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)e−q
·
f(k)− (1− β(1− s))π
1− β
¸
s.t.
β(1− s)qe−q
1− β(1− s)e−qπ +
β(1− s)(1− e−q − qe−q)
1− β(1− s)e−q
·
f(k)− (1− β)JU
1− β(1− s)
¸
−pk ≥ 0.
Assume for a moment that the above programme has an internal solution.
The first-order conditions for π and q can then be solved for the optimal
reserve bid π(k) as a function of k and q. This yields:
π(k) = β(1− s)(1− e
−q − qe−q)
1− β(1− s) + β(1− s)(1− qe−q)
µ
f(k)
1− β(1− s)
¶
. (43)
By virtue of eqn. (21) firms therefore prefer to announce their true outside
option value. Next, substitute (43) into the objective function and the con-
straint of (P2). This yields the constrained optimization programme (P1)
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that is characterized in Lemma 5 and from Proposition 6 we know that this
problem has an internal solution that coincides with an efficient allocation
(kS, qS) ∈ (0,∞)2. In equilibrium the reserve bid of firms is therefore given by
π(kS) = JV (kS) = pkS and the resulting allocation is constrained efficient.¥
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